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Abstract 
In this paper an overview of methods used in  antitrust analysis  to  delineate relevant 
markets is  provided  and  shortcomings  are  pointed  out.  A practical methodology to 
delineate relevant  geographical and  product markets  is  developed,  starting from the 
theoretical defInition of a relevant antitrust market. Based on criteria used by business 
strategists  in  segmenting  markets,  the  new  methodology  makes  use  of strategic 
information on the  position of a company  and  its  competitors in  a specifIc  industry 
sector  to  delineate  relevant  markets.  The  usefulness  of the  new  methodology  is 
illustrated for the European truck industry. 
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Relevant market definition is  a tool to define  the  boundaries of competition between 
fIrms. The market defInition makes it possible to calculate market shares and thus gives 
meaningful information about market power. This information serves for application in 
merger  control  regulations,  competition  policy,  a.o.  .  However,  in  spite  of  its 
importance  and  in  spite  of good theoretical principles  about  market  delineation,  no 
straightforward practical methodology exists. The purpose of this paper is to develop a 
practical methodology, based on the use of strategic business information, that enables 
a better measurement of the relevant market,  both in  respect of the product and  the 
geographic market. 
The paper is  structured as  follows.  Section I explains the problem of delineating  the 
relevant market following the practice in antitrust cases deafu,g with mergers. Several 
existing techniques to delineate relevant antitrust markets will be summarised, as  well 
as their shortcomings. Section 2 links the market delineation techniques from antitrust 
to the actual criteria used by business strategists to segment markets. This yields a new 
methodology for delineating relevant markets. The usefulness of this new methodology 
will  be  shown  in  section  3,  where  it  will  be  applied  for  delineating  the  relevant 
geographical and product market in the truck industry. 
HOW TO DEFINE THE RELEVANT MARKET? 
A. Conceptnal framework 
For  purposes  of European  Community  law  in  the  context  of concentrations,  the 
delineation  of the  relevant  antitrust  market  is  based  on the  abstract  concept  of the 
hypothetical monopolist (EC Communication 97/C  372/03, point  17).  This  approach 
focuses on the ability of companies to exercise monopoly power over a well-defmed 
product  and  geographic  space.  A  candidate  market  is  called  the  relevant  antitrust 
market if  the hypothetical monopolist can profItably set a price in that market which is 
2 significantly higher than the competitive price (in the range of 5%  to  10%), without 
major loss of sales. 
This  condition  can  be  translated  based  on  the  profit-maximisation  condition  for  a 
monopoly. In  this last condition the monopoly price pc  can deviate from the marginal 
costs MC as follows: 
with epc = price elasticity of demand (epe < 0). 
After manipulation this equation becomes: 
pJp = pJMC = epc/(epc + 1)  with p = competitive price level. 
A method to delineate relevant antitrust markets can then be to include those products 
c in the relevant market if: 
pJp =  piMC =  epc/(epe + 1) > 1 + t 
with t = significant threshold (5% to  10%). 
However, accurate data on epc mostly lack and thus other less precise methods have to 
be used. Less abstract methods used in  the  economic literature to delineate relevant 
antitrust markets unfortunately all  suffer from shortcomings.  Many of these tests are 
actually based on the principle of an economic market rather than on the principle of a 
relevant antitrust market, which is a major drawback. An economic market is based on 
the  principle  of arbitrage,  i.e.  an economic  market  is  that  geographic  and  product 
market  within  which  prices  are  linked  to  one  another  by  supply- or  demand-side 
arbitrage  and prices in  that  market can be  treated  independently of other prices.  A 
relevant antitrust market on the other hand is based on the principle of market power, 
i.e.  on the ability of a firm  to raise its price  above the competitive price level.  This 
entails that the delineation of the economic market can be completely different from the 
delineation of the relevant antitrust market. 
In the next paragraphs both categories of methods will be discussed shortly and their 
shortcomings will be pointed out. 
3 B. Methods based on the principle of  market power 
Residual demand estimation 
This fIrst method is probably one of the best methods for market delineation, because it 
is  one of the few  methods which  is  most directly built on the defmition of a relevant 
antitrust market instead of on the defInition of an economic market. However, lack of 
reliable data and some methodological problems make it difficult to use the method in 
practice. 
Method 
Baker and Bresnahan (1985, 1988) and Scheffman and Spiller (1987) present a method 
which is  directly meant to  estimate  the residual demand elasticity.  More specifIcally, 
Baker and Bresnahan (1985, 1988) develop a product differentiated oligopoly model in 
which residual demands facing  fIrms  or groups of frrms  can be derived and estimated 
without  estimating  the  Marshallian  demand  curves.  Their  analysis  is  intended  to 
determine how market power possessed by the parties to a merger would be affected 
by  an  eventual  merger.  Additionally,  Scheffman  and  Spiller  (1987)  consider  the 
estimation  of these  residual  demand  curves  for  use  in  market  delineation  in  a 
geographic  context.  The  method  of residual  demand  estimation  is  in  priciple  fairly 
simple.  By  using  marginal  costs  as  an  instrument,  an  estimated  residual  demand 
elasticity is simply a measure of the extent to which cost shocks are passed through to 
prices. If  cost shocks are largely passed through to price with relatively little effect on 
the quantity, then the residual demand is fairly inelastic.  If cost shocks are not passed 
on  or are  passed  on  but  quantity falls  by  a  proportionately  large  amount,  then  the 
residual demand is fairly elastic. 
Problems 
There are several shortcomings to this method. Froeb and Werden (1991,  1992) indicate 
several limitations  and  problems  associated  with  the residual  demand  approach,  such  as 
problems of extrapolation and problems dealing with nonstationarity.  They also  point out 
some problems that arise with the estimation procedure to be used. Finally, they notice that 
4 the model only considers a static equilibrium and that the dynamic process is not taken into 
account. 
One of  the main disadvantages for practical use of this method is the high data requirement. 
Firm data are needed, and good instruments should be available.  In addition to price and 
quality  information,  cost  information  is  needed.  The  cost  information  must  also  vary 
between the different proposed markets. Whenever these data are not available, a different 
approach is needed. 
Further, the method as it stands now, only takes the consequences of price changes into 
account.  Consequences  due to  changes  in  other  variables,  such  as  advertising  or other 
marketing instruments are not considered. Especially, in some sectors or industries this is a 
major drawback. 
Demand elasticities 
If data were sufficiently available,  the residual demand estimation method would be  ideal 
for relevant market delineation. But as already mentioned, in most cases the necessary data 
are not available.  As an alternative, Sleuwaegen (1994) decomposes the residual demand 
elasticity into several different elasticities. 
The elasticity of residual demand actually consists of two parts:  first,  the partial demand 
elasticity, which constitutes the most direct influence on the residual demand elasticity and 
second, the competitive reaction elasticity. Examining these  different  elasticities  in  detail 
also provides information about the size of  the residual demand elasticity. 
As also these elasticities are not readily available, the same reasoning can be used. Instead 
of directly estimating  the different  elasticities,  different  factors  related  to  the  elasticities 
could be  examined,  which  could already lead to  a rough estimate  whether the  residual 
demand elasticity in a specific situation is low or high. 
The following elements influence the magnitude of the residual demand elasticity. First, 
the partial demand elasticity tends to be larger (which makes monopoly power lower) 
whenever: 
5 1.  There are more good substitutes available at competitive prices; 
2.  The good is less important for the consumer; 
3.  The good is more sensitive to purchasing power (income); 
4.  The breadth of the usability of the product is larger; 
5.  The product is less durable; 
6.  It takes less time for the consumer to react to price changes. 
The second important elasticity is the competitive reaction elasticity. This elasticity is 
larger (which again makes monopoly power smaller) whenever: 
1.  The number of competitors increase; 
2.  Demand for the products is growing slowly; 
3.  Competitors are tempted to use price cuts or other competitive weapons to boost 
unit volume; 
4.  The products of competitors are not so  strongly differentiated that buyers should 
incur high switching cost; 
5.  The size of the pay-off from a successful strategic move is larger; 
6.  It costs more to get out of a business than to stay in; 
7.  Firms differ more in terms of their strategies. 
Further,  competitive  reactions  and  equilibrium  responses  for  competing  products 
crucially depend on the supply elasticity or the ease with which similar products can be 
supplied by  other producers.  A larger  supply  elasticity will  of course form  a larger 
competitive  force  and  it  will  thus  decrease  the  monopoly  power.  Two  different 
situations can be distinguished: supply substitution from actual competitors, and supply 
substitution from potential competitors. 
Regarding actual supply conditions, the supply elasticity is larger whenever: 
1.  The opportunity to buy from other suppliers is large; 
2.  The goods can be transported easily; 
3.  Switching costs are relatively low; 
4.  Transportation costs are relatively low. 
The supply elasticity with respect to potential supply conditions is larger whenever: 
1.  Sunk costs are low; 
2.  Certain similar industries are in the position of overcapacity; 
6 3.  Government policies (like tariffs, quotas, and price controls) are not present; 
4.  Barriers to entries created by the distribution system are low; 
5.  The amount of R&D  investments,  the length of the development period, patents, 
etc. do not limit new entrants that much; 
6.  Economies of scale are low 
7.  There is no risk of strong retaliation if  a new firm enters; 
8.  Market demand is growing. 
Evaluation 
Investigating  all  these  different  influences  on  the  residual  demand  elasticity  may 
provide a better understanding of the different disciplinary forces and therefore on the 
market power of a specific firm or a group of firms.  However, since it  is  difficult  to 
estimate the size of all these effects, it is not possible to delineate the relevant antitrust 
market exactly by use of this method. It may however provide enough information in a 
specific situation to decide whether a firm or a group of firms  does not have enough 
market power to control a market. In order to determine the exact size of the relevant 
antitrust market however, more detailed estimates are needed. 
c. Methods based on the principle of arbitrage 
Whereas the fust two methods follow closely the definition of a relevant antitrust market, 
they  are  both very  difficult  to  use  in  practice,  due  to  a  lack  of adequate  information. 
Therefore,  many methods  have  been  developed based  on the  definition  of an  economic 
market.  These  alternative  methods  focus  on  one  or more  factors  related  to  the  partial 
demand  elasticity  and  the  competitive  reaction  elasticity  and  thus  give  only  a  partial 
indication  of market  power.  In  the  next  section  the  most  important  methods  will  be 
reviewed. 
7 Price tests 
In this section several price tests which are used in the literature to delineate the relevant 
antitrust market will be briefly reviewed. The idea behind all these tests is that prices of two 
goods that belong to the same market should move together. These tests are thus based on 
the definition of an economic market  instead  of on the  definition  of a relevant  market. 
Although the method has been criticised because of the use of  the wrong market definition, 
these price tests might be a good indicator for the partial demand elasticity. 
Many scholars (e.g. Kottke (1960), Areeda and Turner (1978), Stigler and Sherwin (1985)) 
advocate the use of price correlations to delineate antitrust markets.  Stigler and Sherwin 
(1985)  even  argue  that  price  correlations  should  be  the  test  for  delineating  antitrust 
markets. According to them, the similarity of  price movements captures the essential role of 
competition in dominating the price movements within each part of the market. Whenever 
closely parallel price movements are found between various places, the products should be 
placed in the same market. Similarly, whenever significant nonparallel price movements are 
found, the products are not in the same market. 
However,  as  Stigler  and  Sherwin  (1985)  state,  there  exists  no  unique  criterion  for 
determining  whether a correlation is  large enough  to  place  one  product  or area in  the 
relevant market delineated for the other. 
Moreover, Werden and Froeb (1993) indicate that the use of price correlations to delineate 
antitrust markets is incorrect and involves many problems. Their most fundamental problem 
is  that  products  which  must  be  placed  in  the  same  market,  because  they  are  close 
substitutes, do not necessarily have prices that are highly correlated. 
In a similar vein Bishop and Walker (1996)  address the issue of price correlation in  the 
presence of different exchange rates between the markets to make the approach applicable 
to the European situation. Their conclusion is that, "except where exchange rates are very 
stable and so approximate to fixed exchange rates, price correlation should not be used for 
market definition across exchange rate areas" (p.  1). 
8 Another remark by Bishop and Walker (1996) regarding price correlation tests deals with 
stationarity. They argue that to avoid spurious correlation, it is very important to use price 
correlation analysis only after price series have been made stationary. 
A  second price  test  is  the price equality test  (see  e.g.  Shrieves  (1978)  and  Horowitz 
(1981)).  This  test  is  based  on the  proposition  that  if two  geographic  areas  should  be 
considered a single market, then the price at which the product sells in the two areas cannot 
be different. A closely related test to this would be to use normalised prices to correct for 
differences  in  the  products  (see e.g.  Spiller  and  Huang  (1986)).  However,  Werden and 
Froeb  (1993)  remark  that  the  fact  that  the  prices  of two  products  or  areas  differ 
significantly is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for either product or area to be 
in or not to be in the relevant market delineated for the other. 
A third price test  is  the speed of adjustment test (see  e.g.  Mathis,  Harris  and Boehlje 
(1978), who discuss  relative  speeds of adjustment,  and Horowitz (1981),  who  discusses 
absolute speed of adjustment). This type of tests considers the adjustment process through 
which the d.ifference between any pair of prices would converge to its equilibrium leveL If 
the speed of adjustment parameter is  close to zero, then there is  fast convergence to the 
eqUilibrium 
However, also this test has many shortcomings and problems, as is pointed out by Werden 
and Froeb (1993)  and  Uri,  Howell  and  Rifkin  (1985).  Werden  and Froeb  (1993)  even 
suggest that the  use of relative  speeds  of adjustment  is  incorrect.  They argue  that  it  is 
irrelevant that the price of a substitute responds to shocks in  the candidate market more 
slowly than do prices of  products in the candidate market if  both respond very quickly. 
Starting in  1985,  tests for  antitrust market  delineation  were developed that  made use of 
modem time series methods,  such as  Granger causality3, exogeneity4 and measures of 
3  Granger  causality  measures  precedence  and  information  content  but  does  ~ot by  itself indicate 
causality in  the  more  common  use  of the  term.  Klein,  Rifkin,  and  Uri  (1985,  p.  Ill) describes 
Granger causality as follows: "A time series X, 'causes' another time series Y,  , in the sense defined by 
Granger if the present Y  can be predicted better by using past values of X than by not doing so". 
4  Slade (1986, p.  294) explains that this  test  "seeks to determine whether price movements  in  one 
regions  have  repercussions  in  another;  that is,  is  seeks  to  establish  if price  determination  in  one 
9 feedback  (see e.g.  Klein,  Rifkin and Uri (1985), Uri and Rifkin (1985), Uri,  Howell and 
Rifkin (1985), Cartwright, Karnerschen and Huang (1989), Slade (1986)). These methods 
are actually refinements of  the test proposed by Horowitz (1981). 
However,  Werden and  Froeb  (1993)  show  that  the  problems  with  using  measures  of 
feedback to  delineate relevant markets are essentially the same as  those with  using price 
correlation, while the other two tests are subject to much the same criticism as the speed of 
adjustment tests. 
Cointegrated series5  can be described by models, known as  error correcting, that allow 
long-run  components  of  variables  to  obey  equilibrium  constraints  while  short-run 
components have  a flexible  dynamic  structure (see Engle and  Granger  (1987)).  Whalen 
(1990) argues that if  two geographic locations comprise a single geographic market, their 
price series should be found to be co integrated. 
However, cointegration is not a sensible test for relevant market delineation when series do 
not have unit roots, as is often the case (Werden and Froeb (1993)). 
Evaluation 
The key criticism against all these tests is that the notion of supply substitution is not taken 
into  account.  Next  to  demand  substitution,  supply  substitution  can  be  a  competitive 
restraint which prevents a firm from raising its prices. Therefore, a careful analysis  of the 
industry should be added in order to minimise possible errors in using price test. In spite of 
all the limitations, price tests can yield valuable information. As Bishop and Walker (1996) 
argue,  "given its  relatively  low  information  requirements  and  ease  of use,  it  would  be 
foolish  to  ignore  a  technique  that  is  potentially  information  bearing"  (p.  1),  and  "an 
understanding of  the potential weaknesses and pitfalls in the use of  price correlation analysis 
should allow the investigator to maximise the usefulness of  the procedure" (p. 17). 
market is exogenous to price formation in another and vice versa". 
5 A group of non-stationary time series is cointegrated if there is a linear combination of them that is 
stationary; that is,  the combination does not have a stochastic trend. As an  example, consumption and 
income are likely to be cointegrated. 
10 Shipment data 
Similar to the price tests,  also  the shipment data method tries to give a good alternative 
indication  of the partial demand  elasticity.  Elzinga and Hogarty  (1973,  1978)  present  a 
method  that  is  only  applicable  in  delineating  geographic  markets.  They  argue  that  the 
presence of shipments between two geographic areas  is  an  indication of the fact that the 
areas should actually be regarded as one single market. The method is constructed by the 
application of two tests:  the LOFI ("Little Out  From Inside")  and the LIFO (''Little In 
From Outside") test. The LOFI test concerns the supply side and poses the question: 'What 
is the smallest geographic region required to account for nearly all shipments from a given 
producing area?'.  The LIFO test deals with the demand side and poses the question:  'Of 
total purchases within the region identified by the LOFI test,  do  nearly all  emanate from 
within  that region itse]f?'. If both 75%  (or alternatively  90%)  of the  consumption of a 
product is produced within a specific area, and 75% (or 90%) of the production within this 
area is consumed within this area, then a distinct geographic market has been identified.6 
Evaluation 
Werden  (1981)  criticises  the  approach  of Elzinga  and  Hogarty  (and  also  the  method 
suggested by Shrieves (1978». In his paper he identifies two important situations in which 
the proposed test  will  produce  erroneous  results.  On  the one  hand  the  method fails  to 
identify the  concept of cross-price elasticities of demand,  on the other hand the method 
cannot evaluate the hypothetical reactions after a possible merger. Also Stigler and Sherwin 
(1985) have some reservations about the method. 
Nevertheless, the pattern of shipments can certainly provide information about the size of 
the  geographic  relevant  market.  In  line  with  the  arguments  of Elzinga  and  Hogarty 
(1973,1978), it is essential to take both the LIFO test and the LOFI test into consideration. 
After all, there can be disciplinary forces from both the demand side and the supply side. 
6 Shrieves (1978) extends the test developed by Elzinga and Hogarty by including price data. 
11 However, in  case of a  relatively large product differentiation,  this  could imply  that  the 
disciplinary forces on the prices could be too small. Further, one should be very careful in 
making the opposite statement. It may well be the case that, although there is no (or very 
little) movement of goods between regions or countries, the outside region does constitute 
a disciplinary force on the inside region, especially in situations where products are rather 
homogeneous. 
Diversion ratio 
Shapiro  (1995)  defines  the  diversion  ratio  as  the  fraction  of sales  lost  by  firm  A  to 
competitor B  due to a  price  increase by firm  A.  Whenever  econometric  estimation  of 
elasticities is  not possible due to lack of sufficient  good data, there still  may be relevant 
consumer survey data that can be  used to directly estimate the diversion  ratio  (Shapiro, 
1995). 
The diversion ratio is closely related to the cross-elasticity of demand. Willig (1991) notes 
that the ratio of the cross-price elasticity to the own price elasticity measures the share of 
the marginal sales of one brand that will divert to another in response to a price increase. 
C. Conclusion 
All the above mentioned tests have many shortcomings or the methods based on the 
principle of arbitrage can give only a partial view on the relevant market, no method is 
comprehensive.  However,  although  none  of the  alternative  methods  provides  the 
optimal solution, most methods give some insight on the size and scope of the relevant 
antitrust market. In accordance with Bolton (1998), who argues in favour of building 
up various kinds of evidence to  get a clear picture, building up evidence combining 
several methods could then lead to a substantial knowledge of the exact size and scope 
of the relevant antitrust market. 
12 MARKET  DELINEATION  TECHNIQUES  USED  BY  BUSINESS 
STRATEGISTS 
The previous methods discussed so far follow directly from basic economic theory. In 
applying  these  methods,  practitioners  often  overlook  the  information  that  can  be 
obtained from the deployed strategies  of fIrms.  As  is  argued  hereafter,  the business 
strategists use interesting techniques that  may yield  interesting indications of relevant 
anti-trust  markets.  Business  strategy  techniques  are  concentrated  around  the 
competitors' reactions and can give a good alternative for the direct estimation of both 
partial demand elasticity and the competitive reaction elasticity as will be shown in the 
next sections. 
One of the primary tasks managers face in formulating competitive strategy consists of 
defIning the business, including the relevant arena of competition: What businesses are 
we in? Where are we competing? Who are our competitors? This approach provides a 
useful source of information for identification of the relevant market. 
A. Conceptual approach 
When trying  to  defme  a business,  two  possible  perspectives  emerge  (Day  (1997»: 
either  in  terms  of its  served  market  (demand-side  definition)  or  in  terms  of the 
products or  services of which  it  is  comprised  (supply-side  definition).  Within  both 
perspectives patterns of substitution can be examined. Substitution can be viewed from 
a  demand-side  perspective  to  account  for  all  the  ways  customers  can  satisfy  their 
needs, or a supply-side perspective to include all the competitors with the capabilities 
to serve these customers. These two perspectives are closely intertwined and should be 
integrated when defming a business. 
But although integration of both supply- and demand-side perspective is promoted, in 
many studies emphasis is  placed on only one perspective.  In  the next  paragraphs the 
supply- and  demand-side  view  will  be  discussed  separately.  In  a  later  stage  both 
perspectives will be integrated into one framework. 
13 B. Product-oriented supply perspective 
The  supply-side  approach  starts  with the  group  of competitors  who  could possibly 
serve the needs of a group of customers. It explicitly considers technological similarity, 
relative production costs and distribution coverage. 
This supply-side perspective addresses the following questions (Day (1990)): 
•  Which competitors are serving related product classes with the same technology, 
manufacturing processes, material sources sales force and distribution channels? 
•  What is the geographic scope of the market? Is it regional, national or global? 
•  Which competitors should be included - only those presently serving the market or 
potential entrants with a capacity to compete? 
These  questions  are  vital  to  an  understanding  of the  relative  cost  standing  of a 
business, and degree of transferability of experience into related arenas. 
To draw the boundaries of the competitive arena,  the  supply-side approach looks for 
significant  discontinuities  in  the  patterns  of costs,  capital  requirements  and  margins 
along the product and customer dimensions. These discontinuities create barriers that 
insulate prices and profits within  a product market from the activities  of competitors 
outside the market. They also  discourage easy entry by potential competitors. When 
boundaries  are  properly  defmed,  the  relative  profitability  of competitors  within  a 
market can meaningfully be compared. 
The  criteria  used  in  this  supply-side  perspective  form  the  basis  of the  Standard 
Industrial Classification  (SIC)  or European NACE  system and  have  generally  wide 
acceptance because they appear easy to implement. They lead to seemingly stable and 
clear-cut definitions, and importantly, involve factors  largely controllable by the firm; 
implying that the defmition is  somehow controllable as  well.  They are also  helpful in 
identifying  potential  competitors,  because  of  similarities  in  manufacturing  and 
distribution systems. 
Nevertheless, this approach has been criticised to be arbitrary and based exclusively on 
managerial  judgement  and  intuition  (Curran  and  Goodfellow  (1989)).  Especially 
14 marketing-planners  argue  that  this  approach  seldom  gives  a  satisfactory  picture  of 
either  the  threats  or  the  opportunities  facing  a  business.  Therefore,  considerable 
attention  has  been  directed  toward  defIning  product-markets  from  the  customers' 
perspective. 
C. Customer-oriented demand perspective 
In  the  customer-oriented  approach,  customer  needs  and  requirements  are  at  the 
forefront. This approach is  mainly based on two assumptions  .. First, it is  assumed that 
individuals  seek the benefIts  that products provide,  rather than the  products per se. 
Secondly, consumers consider the available alternatives from the vantage point of the 
usage contexts with which they have experience or the specifIc applications  they are 
considering; it is the usage requirement which dictates the benefIts being sought. 
On the basis ofthese two premises a product-market is defined as follows: 
'the set of products judged to  be substitutes,  within  those usage  situations  in 
which similar patterns of benefIts are sought, and the customers for whom such 
usages are relevant' (Day, Shocker and Srivastava (1979), p.IO). 
From this definition, substitutability implies that the purpose or application, rather than 
the  product  features  as  such,  becomes  the  organising  theme  for  considering 
alternatives. This means that this approach encompasses more than just substitutes-in-
kind, it also includes substitutes-in-use7• 
Analytical methods for customer-oriented product-market definitions: 
Customer-oriented  methods  for  identifying  product-markets  can  be  classified  by 
behavioural or judgmental data. 
7 Substitutes-in-kind: all the products that look alike and represent the same application of a distinct 
technology to the provision of a distinct set of customer functions. 
Substitutes-in-use: the products serve the same functions, but may do this in a very different way. 
15 Behavioural  methods  are  based  on  inference  of actual  substitutability  from  buyer 
behaviour (Day, Shocker and Srivastava (1979». It provides a good indication of what 
people  actually  do,  but  not  necessarily  what  they  might  do  under  changed 
circumstances.  Behavioural  techniques  are  particularly  suited  for  the  study  of 
established and relatively stable markets and  are  of value for predictive purposes only 
so  long as  data on  prevailing market conditions are  available  (e.g.  pricing structures, 
promotional  expenditures  and  effectiveness,  product  availability, ... ).  Well-known 
behavioural methods are cross-elasticity of demand, similarities in behaviour and brand 
switching  (Day,  Shocker and  Srivastava (1979».  Unfortunately,  the lack  of suitable 
data often puts a heavy restriction on the  application  of the behavioural techniques. 
Therefore, we will not go into more details about these different methods in this study. 
In  the  judgmental  methods  data  are  primary  collected  following  the  buyer's 
perceptions  of substitutability between  products  and  it  constructs  market  structures 
accordingly. The methods are built on the fact that customers often have considerable 
knowledge of existing brands through personal or friends' experiences and exposure to 
promotion. Their perceptions may not always correspond to what manufacturers may 
believe about their own or competitive products. 
In the short term, judgemental techniques probably offer the most potential and this is 
reflected by  the  emergence  and  development  of new  techniques  during  the  last  ten 
years. Day,  Shocker and Srivastava (1979) analyse four  analytical approaches within 
the judgemental methods: decision sequence analysis, perceptual mapping,  technology 
substitution analysis and customer judgments of substitutability. 
1.  Decision sequence analysis 
The decision sequence analysis utilises 'protocols' of consumer decision making, which 
indicate the  sequence in  which  various  criteria are  employed to  reach  a final  choice 
(Bettman  (1971),  Haines  (1974».  Based on  similar  decision  procedures,  individuals 
can be grouped into segments. 
Although this method has its benefits, such as giving a better insight into the hierarchy 
of product types and understanding the patterns of competition, it also has some major 
drawbacks.  First,  the  typical  representations  of decision  sequences  appear  quite 
16 complex and pose serious difficulties for  aggregation of the  individual models  into  a 
small  number  of meaningful  segments.  Further,  since  it  is  generally  expensive  to 
develop protocols, a representative sample of customers may be unrealisable. 
2.  Perceptual mapping 
Perceptual mapping  includes  a large family  of techniques used to  create a geometric 
representation of customer's perceptions of the qualities possessed by productslbrands 
comprising  a  previously  defined  product-market  (Green  (1975)).  Those  techniques 
include direct scaling, factor analysis, multiple discriminant analysis a.o. 
Unfortunately,  such diversity of criteria and  method can lead  to  somewhat  different 
perceptual  maps  and  possibly  different  product-market  definitions.  More  empirical 
research  is  still  needed  to  compare  the  alternatives  and  assess  which  produce 
definitions are more valid for particular purposes (Shocker and Srinivasan (1979)). 
3.  Technology substitution analysis 
This method adapts the idea of preference related to distance in a multi-attribute space 
to  the problem of forecasting the substitution of one material, process or product for 
another.  Each successful substitution tends to follow  an  S-shaped or 'logistic' curve 
representing  a  slow  start  as  initial  problems  and  resistance  to  change  have  to  be 
overcome, followed by more rapid progress as  acceptance is  gained and  applications 
can  be  publicised,  and  fmally  a slowing  in  the  pace  of substitution  as  saturation  is 
reached.  A simple  approach to  forecasting  the course  and  speed of the  substitution 
process is to project a function having the appropriate logistics curve, using historical 
data to determine its parameters (Lenz and Lanford (1972)). 
Although criticism can  be  raised  with  respect  to  the  model  structure,  the  approach 
gives  a highly  useful  quantitative measure  of utility,  which  can  be  used  to  estimate 
substitutability among competing products or technologies in specific usage-situations. 
4.  Customer judgments of  substitutability 
Customer judgments of substitutability can be obtained simply by  asking a sample of 
customers  to  indicate  the  degree  of substitutability  between  all  possible  pairs  of 
17 products or brands on  a rating scale.  The results of such analyses  are seldom useful, 
however, for customers lack a specific context within which to make their judgments. 
For this  reason,  substitution-in-use  techniques  have  been  developed  that  give  good 
insights  into  product-market  boundaries.  Customers  are  asked  to  judge  the 
appropriateness or acceptability  of a number of potentially competitive  products for 
specific conditions of use.  A market can then be defined as  a set of products that are 
judged to be appropriate within usage situations in  which  similar patterns of benefits 
are sought. 
D. Market definition: an integrative approach 
To  avoid  myopic  market  definitions,  an  integrative  analysis  should  adopt  both the 
supply- and  demand-side  perspective,  as  there  are  inherent  deficiencies  to  each 
approach.  Otherwise, shifts  in  customer requirements and  needs that may create new 
segments  will  be  overlooked,  and  competitive  threats  from  different  technologies 
which can serve the same functions or satisfy similar needs will not be appreciated. In 
the same sense should the customer perspective not overwhelm the economic realities 
which  dictate the ability  to compete profitably.  Perceptions  of opportunities  may  be 
distorted  where  the  competencies  and  experience  base  of the  company  can  be 
effectively  employed.  Levitt  (1975)  drew  attention  on  this  danger  for  'marketing 
myopia'  when  he  noticed that  "railroads  let  others  take customers  away from  them 
because  they assumed  themselves  to  be  in  the  railroad  business  rather  than  in  the 
transportation  business.  ( ...  )  They  were  product-oriented  instead  of  customer-
oriented. " 
1.  Scope and differentiation 
To  get  a  global  and  complete  definition  of a business,  it  is  necessary  to  define  the 
business  in  terms  of its  'product-market'  strategy,  rather  than  in  terms  of either 
products or served markets alone. Abell (1980) describes products and served markets 
following  a  three-dimensional  conceptualisation:  the  customer  group  dimension,  or 
WHO  is  being  served,  which  may  be  classified  in  a number  of different  ways,  e.g. 
demographics,  user  industry,  buyer  behaviour, ...  ;  secondly,  the  customer  function 
18 dimension, or WHAT NEED is being satisfied; and finally the technological dimension, 
or HOW customer functions are being satisfied. The fmal dimension is felt necessary as 
it  is  often  possible  to  satisfy  a  need  group  using  different  technologies.  All  three 
dimensions play an important role in the business defmition. 
In order to  defme  an  organisation's activity along  the three dimensions discussed by 
Abell,  the  concepts of scope and  differentiation are  used.  Scope defmes  the level  of 
activity  along  each  of the  three  dimensions  whilst  differentiation  defines  how  an 
organisation  participates  along  each  of the  three  dimensions,  and  in  particular  the 
degree of variation in its marketing strategy. In an earlier work, Abell (1979) also uses 
the concept of segmentation alongside scope and differentiation. 
Using  these  concepts,  Abell  abandons  traditional  'demand-side'  and  'supply-side' 
criteria for defming market boundaries and distinguishes between markets, businesses 
and industries as follows: 
•  A business  is  defmed  by  a  selection  of customer  groups  and  functions  and  is 
normally based on one primary technology. 
•  An industry is  defmed by the boundaries of several businesses but is  still usually 
based on a single technology. 
•  A  market  is  defmed  by  the  performance  of given  functions  in  given  customer 
groups, and includes all the substitute technologies to perform those functions. 
Together with Abell, many other studies point out this need for an integrated approach 
(Day (1981),  Abell and  Hammond  (1979», but  only  few  studies come to the actual 
elaboration  of an  integrated  framework.  Taking  a  closer  look  at  revealed  business 
strategies  and  the  competitive  landscape,  useful  information  can  emerge  about  the 
relevant market. 
2.  Relevant competitors and relative market shares 
An  interesting  perspective  in  the  integrative  approach  has  been  given  by  Brooks 
(1995). He argues that the relevant market for a firm can be identified through the use 
of information  on the firm's  competitors.  A competitor then  is  a firm  that  not  only 
produces  similar  goods,  but  also  targets  the  same  customers.  This  last  condition  is 
19 crucial to make both fIrms  competitors: if  they would not target the same  customers, 
they would not have anything to compete over. 
The same reasoning can be  found  in  Koch  (1995)  when he  develops  a methodology 
that is  based on a fIrm's  relevant  (actual and  potential)  competitors,  rather than it's 
relevant  market,  when  determining  a  fIrm's  business  segments.  He  assumes  that  if 
competitors are the same in potential segments and  their market shares are about the 
same,  then  both segments  are  probably actually  one.  Based  on  these  principles,  he 
suggests two very simple and practical 'segmentation tests', which can be applied to  a 
list of possible business segments. 
The fIrst test is a very short test that provides a good fIrst indication. It is based on two 
questions: 
(1) Are competitors in the two potential business segments different or the same? 
If the  answer  is  'different',  then  they  are probably  separate  segments,  and 
there is need to answer question 2 
(2) If the  answer  to  question  1 is  'the  same',  do  the  competitors  (including 
yourself)  have  roughly  similar  market  share  positions  in  the  two  potential 
business segments, i.e.  if competitor A is the leader in one potential segment, 
followed by B, followed by C,  is this the same ranking in the other potential 
segment? If so,  the two areas are probably one single  segment;  if not,  they 
are probably separate segments. 
The second test  is  longer  and more formal  (see  table  I).  It contains  12  questions to 
which  a YESINO  answer  has  to  be  given.  When  adding  the  scores  of the  different 
questions together, the result can be either positive or negative. If  the result is positive, 
the  two  products  or  areas  should  be  treated  as  separate  segments.  If the  result  is 
negative,  both products or areas are currently the same.  The further  away from zero 
the answer is, the more certain is the result. 
20 Table 1: segmentation test 
I~olumn  I~olumn 
A Score  B Score 
I  Are the competitors in the two products or areas the same? 
YES: Column A  / NO: Column B  I  -30  I  +30 
2  Are the Relative Market Shares (RMS) of the fIrm and the leading competitors roughly 
the same in the two products or areas? 
RMS similar: Column A  / RMS different: Column B  I  -50  I  +50 
3  Are the customers the same in the two products or areas? 
YES: Column A  / NO: Column B  I  -20  I  +20 
4  Are the customers' main purchase criteria and their order of importance roughly the same 
in the two products or areas? 
YES: Column A  / NO: Column B  I  -30  I  +30 
5  Are the two products substitutes for each other? 
YES: Column A  / NO:  Column B  I  -10  I  +10 
6  Are the prices of the two products (for equivalent quality) or in the same areas roughly 
the same? 
YES: Column A  / NO: Column B  I  -20  I  +20 
7  Is the fIrm's profItability roughly the same in the two products or 
areas? 
YES: Column A  / NO: Column B  I  -40  I  +40 
8  Do the two products or areas have approximately the case need for capital per dollar of 
sales, i.e. similar capital intensity? 
YES: Column A  / NO: Column B  I  -10  I  +10 
9  Are the cost structures in the two products or areas similar (i.e. roughly the case 
proportion of cost in raw materials, manufacturing, marketing, selling, ...  )? 
YES: Column A  / NO: Column B  I  -10  I  +10 
10  Do the products or areas share at least half of  their costs (the use of common labour, 
machines, premises and management resources for at least half oftheir total costs)? 
YES: Column A  / NO: Column B  I  -30  I  +30 
11  Are there logistical, practical or technological barriers between the two products or areas 
that only some competitors can surmount? 
NO: ColumnA  / YES: Column B  I  -20  I  +20 
12  Is it possible to gain an economical advantage by specialising in one of the 
products/areas by gaining lower costs or higher prices in that product/area as a result of 
focussing on it? 
NO: ColumnA  / YES: Column B  I  -30  I  +30 
21 3.  Strategic group mapping 
Since the formulation of a competitive strategy starts with defIning the relevant market, 
the implemented strategy of a fIrm may in a recursive way provide a good defInition of 
the relevant market on which a fIrm concentrates. One may for instance infer the extent 
of globalisation  of the  market  through  analysis  of the global  strategy of a  fIrm.  To 
evaluate  whether fIrms  actually  have  a  global  strategy,  Yip  (1995)  formulates  fIve 
dimensions,  the  global  strategy  levers.  As  a  fIrst  indicator  he  mentions  market 
participation. When fIrms  are  really  global players,  they are  active in many countries 
worldwide on a signifIcant base, i.e.  they posses a signifIcant more or less  equivalent 
market share in  several countries. This in  contrast to a traditional multinational fIrm, 
where market shares can differ between the countries in which it operates. Secondly, a 
global  player  will  offer  the  same  products  worldwide.  Here  not  only  completely 
standardised products are meant, but also related products from a market-based view 
or a  technological  view  (i.e.  related  diversifIcation).  In  the  same  sense,  as  a  third 
indicator, a standardised marketing where the same brand names, advertising, etc.  are 
used, also points to a possible global strategy. A fourth indicator for a fIrm to have a 
global  strategy,  is  the  location  of  value-adding  activities.  Whereas  a  traditional 
multinational duplicates many value-adding activities,  a truly global fIrm  locates each 
individual  activity in  only  that  country most  appropriate  for  that  activity.  As  a  last 
element,  Yip  formulates  the  competitive  moves  of a  fIrm.  In  a  global  strategy, 
competitive moves have to be integrated across countries rather than making  distinct 
moves  by  country.  Integrated competitive  moves  also  affect  all  the  previous  global 
strategy levers  of global market participation, global products,  global  marketing  and 
global activity location, typically needing to be used in conjunction with one or more of 
them. When several of the indicators point in the direction of a global strategy, from an 
anti-trust point of view it can be said that the world is the relevant anti-trust market. If 
the  levers  all  apply  to  a region  in  the  world,  i.e.  the  EU,  the  fIrm  has  a  regionally 
differentiated strategy, comprising for instance the EU as a relevant market. 
A more general technique  for  getting  an  indication  about  the relevant  market  when 
analysing a fIrm's strategic behaviour is strategic group mapping (Porter (1980)). The 
formation of strategic groups is based on the boundaries drawn by both customers and 
22 competitors, as well as  the history and capabilities of the fIrm  and competitors  (Day 
(1997)). Within such strategic groups, fIrms  look alike in their scope of activities and 
market coverage, follow similar strategies, .... Moves by the frrms  in the same group 
will be quickly countered, while initiatives from within other groups do not call for a 
reaction. An industry may contain only one strategic group when all  sellers  approach 
the market with essentially identical strategies or, at the other extreme, there may be as 
many strategic groups as there are competitors when each rival pursues a distinctively 
different market approach. 
A strategic group map is constructed by plotting the market positions of the industry's 
strategic  groups  on a  two-dimensional  map  using  two  strategic  variables  as  axes. 
Porter (1980)  indicates  fIve  important  guidelines  for  constructing  a  strategic group 
map, which he summarised as follows: 
•  Identify the broad characteristics that  differentiate fIrms  in  the  industry  from 
one another; 
•  Plot  the  frrms  on  a  two-variable  map  using  pairs  of these  differentiating 
characteristics; 
•  Assign frrms that fall  in  about the same strategy space to the  same  strategic 
group; 
•  Draw circles around each strategic group, making the  circles proportional to 
the size ofthe group's respective share of total industry sales revenues. 
As Day (1997) pointed out, one should note that strategic groups are not fIxed over 
time. They are in constant evolution and it  is  important to have a well-reasoned point 
of  view on how they are likely to change. 
Also Boardman and Vining (1996) use strategic groups as the best synthesis between 
both approaches. In their study an explicit framework has been developed to come to 
strategic groups starting from fIrm specifIc product-customer matrices. Figure 1 gives 
a schematic overview of the different steps in determining strategic groups. 
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Figure 1:  Strategic group mapping based on product  -customer clusters 
24 THE  RELATIONSIDP  BETWEEN  THE  BUSINESS  PERSPECTIVE  AND 
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
It is  interesting  at  this  point  to  relate  the  different  methods  used  within  strategic 
business perspective to the concept of the residual demand elasticity, used in antitrust 
analysis. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEwORK 
CMarshallianl partial demand elasticity 
Competitive reaction elasticities 
Actual supply conditions 
Potential supply conditions 
STRAT. BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE 
Customer-oriented approach 
Behavioural methods: cross-elasticity 
of demand 
Judgmental methods: technology 
substitution analysis, customer 
judgements of substitutability 
Integrative approach 
E 
Strategic grou ps 
•  Relevant competition and relative 
market share positioning 
Supply-side approach 
F.  Discontinuities in patterns of costs  I:.  Discontinuities in  margins 
The  figure  above  shows  how  the  different  approaches  that  exist  in  the  strategic 
management literature can be matched with one or more of the different components 
from the residual demand approach. 
In  the customer-oriented approach two  groups of methods emerge:  the  behavioural 
methods and the judgmental methods. 
From a behavioural perspective,  especially the cross-elasticity of demand  could be  a 
useful  measure  for  demand  substitution.  The  measure  can  accurately  identify  a 
product's  substitutes  and  thus  be  linked  easily  to  the  Marshallian  partial  demand 
25 elasticity.  Unfortunately, practical use of this measure gives  rise  to  several problems 
(Sleuwaegen (1994)). 
The  second  group  of judgmental  methods  (Day,  Shocker  and  Srivastava  (1979)) 
contains analytical methodologies that can be linked to the partial demand elasticity as 
well as  to  the competitive reaction elasticity. Customer judgements of substitutability 
can give  an  interesting insight  in  the  demand-side  substitution  of a product.  On  the 
other hand,  technology substitution analyses are used to shed a light on what material, 
process  or  product  could  be  substituted  by  another  material,  process  or product. 
Therefore, they can be used to estimate substitutability among competing products or 
technologies and thus give an indication on actual supply conditions. 
From the  supply-side  approach  methodologies such  as  discontinuities  in  patterns  of 
costs  or  margins  can  be  used  to  divide  different  products  into  segments.  These 
methodologies can point out where the actual competitors are situated and thus give an 
indication about competitive reactions. 
The  integrative  approach  tries  to  combine  both  previous  approaches.  The 
determination  of strategic  groups  (Porter (1980),  Boardman and  Vining  (1996))  as 
well  as  the  methodology  based  on  the  relative  market  shares  and  competitors, 
suggested  by  Koch  (1995),  contain  elements  that  are  related  to  all  the  different 
components of the residual demand elasticity. Both analyses try to fmd  indications of 
both partial demand elasticities and competitive reaction elasticities. 
The  two  methods  from  the  integrative  approach  will  be  illustrated  in  the  next 
paragraph, where both methods will be combined to identify the relevant market in the 
truck industry in terms of product and geographical space. 
26 APPLICATION: THE TRUCK INDUSTRY 
A description of the situation and developments of the European truck industry in the 
late 80's may serve to illustrate the use of strategic group mapping and market share 
and competitors analysis in determining the relevant market. 
The European truck industry, an  no 1989 
In  1989  seven major producers were active in  the truck industry in Western Europe. 
This industry usually was segmented according to  Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW)  into 
three  segments:  light  GVW  (>3.5T-4.9T),  medium  GVW  (5T-16T),  heavy  GVW 
(> 16T). The manufacturers could differ significantly in segment scope. 
Most players were active in several European countries, although also here differences 
emerged between those seven producers. 
Overall,  in  1988  the  West-European  manufacturers  produced  1.250.000  vans  and 
400.000 trucks. Of the vans  12% was destined for exports. The rest covered 80%  of 
the  West-European  demand.  The  remaining  20%  were  imported.  The  heavy  truck 
sector had almost no imports (2%), but quite significant exports (22%). 
The relevant market 
The research question in this application is whether in the late 80' s one could speak of 
one  market  for  trucks,  independent  of GVW  segments,  and  of a  Single  European 
Market as the relevant market for the truck industry. 
1.  Relevant  competitors and relative market share positioning 
When  considering  the  segments  light  weight  trucks  «6T) and  heavy  weight  trucks 
(>6T), it can be seen from figure 2 that very different players dominate both segments. 
This indication points out that both light and heavy weight trucks should be considered 
as separate groups for relevant market delineation purposes. 
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Figure  2:  Market  share  of European  new  truck  unit  sales  by  manufacturer  and  by 
segment, 1989 data 
In  he  same  line,  also  for delineating the  relevant  geographical market,  market  share 
data for the different truck makers can give a clear indication. For 1989 data on market 
shares are available for the UK, France, Italy, West Germany and the Netherlands (see 
figure 3). 
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Figure  3:  registrations  of trucks  >3.5T  GVW  in  West  Germany,  Italy,  France,  the 
Netherlands and the UK 
29 In three out of the five countries (i.e.  Italy, West Germany and France) one domestic 
manufacturer heavily dominated the national market. In general one can say that  most 
European truck manufacturers  in  1989  adopted a more multinational strategy than  a 
global or European strategy. Most players tried to maintain a number-one position in 
one country, but had  a much smaller market share  in  the others.  Only Daimler  Benz 
made attempts to evolve to a more global European position. 
2.  Strategic group mapping 
In analysing corporate strategy it  is  useful to  look more closely at the decisions truck 
manufacturers have made with respect to the following aspects of competitive scope: 
•  Segment scope: in which product segments is the company specialised? 
•  Industry scope: in which industries is the company active? 
•  Vertical  scope:  what  is  the  degree  of vertical  integration,  backward  as  well  as 
forward? 
•  Geographical scope: which geographic strategy is followed; in how many countries 
is the company active? 
In the late 80's there were considerable differences in the range of products offered by 
truck  makers  in  Europe.  Some manufacturers  (e.g.  Daimler  Benz,  Iveco)  offered  a 
wide range of products in  all  size  and  weight  classes  and  applications,  while  others 
(e.g.  Scania, DAF)  concentrated on only one  segment.  Parallel to this  difference  in 
segment scope, when mapping the manufacturers along the vertical integration axis,  a 
tendency can be seen for manufacturers with a full line to be more vertically integrated 
than manufacturers offering only a narrow line (see figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Vertical integration and product line 
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At the same time these full  line-manufacturers  took on a more international oriented 
position,  whereas  the  more  focused  manufacturers  were  still  very  concentrated  on 
























Source: adopted from Simaey (1987) and Reekmans (1989) 
Figure 5: Product line and geographical spread 
31 Combining  these  differences  in  geographical  segments,  vertical  and  geographical 
scope, two strategic groups could be identified. A fIrst  group of manufacturers focused 
on one segment, that was not highly vertically integrated and concentrated mainly on 
national markets. The second group took on a broader scope in product range as well 
as geographical segments and was usually more vertically integrated. 
From the strategic maps  it can again be concluded that in  the late  80'  s the relevant 
market in the European truck industry was defInitely not the EC. There also appears a 
marked  difference  between  full  line  suppliers  and  specialised  heavy  weight  truck 
suppliers. Nevertheless, although several truck manufacturers were still very dependent 
on their national market, this situation seemed to be  changing.  Through mergers and 
acquisitions some of the national players are trying to reposition themselves on a more 
pan-European side following  the economic integration of the European Market (e.g. 
M.A.N., DAF). 
Conclusion 
The European truck industry  application illustrates  very well  how  business  tools  as 
strategic group mapping and relative market share positioning can be useful in cases of 
relevant market delineation.  They yield  interesting indications of the boundaries of a 
market. Moreover, combining both methods, an integrated view on both product and 
geographical scope can be developed. 
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